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State Approaches to the 




This chapter examines the general approach that states and local 
workforce agencies took in planning and initiating workforce invest-
ment activities with Recovery Act funding. As will be discussed in the 
chapter, states and localities were strongly encouraged by the USDOL 
to begin spending Recovery Act funding quickly after they were noti-
fi ed of their allocation—and to make certain that expenditures adhered 
to Recovery Act requirements and provided long-term benefi ts to 
worker and employer customers of the public workforce system (i.e., 
through the WIA, Wagner-Peyser/ES, and TAA programs). The chapter 
describes early planning and start-up of Recovery Act–funded activi-
ties, organizational and staffi ng responses to the availability of Recov-
ery Act funding, training approaches and technical assistance activities 
involved in initiating Recovery Act–funded employment and training 
activities, early patterns of states’ expenditures of Recovery Act funds, 
and changes made while the Recovery Act funds were being spent.
EARLY PLANNING AND START-UP
All state and local workforce agencies mentioned that the time they 
had to plan and initiate Recovery Act–funded activities, from the time 
the president signed the Recovery Act into law in February 2009 until 
they fi rst began spending Recovery Act resources on employment and 
training services (as early as April 2009), was very short. States had to 
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move quickly to begin spending Recovery Act funding within a mat-
ter of weeks after being notifi ed of their Recovery Act funding allo-
cation in March 2009. There was strong pressure on states and local 
workforce agencies to spend Recovery Act funding rapidly (if possible, 
front-loading expenditures into the fi rst year of the two years available) 
and, at the same time, to spend the resources wisely. In particular, states 
and local areas indicated that they were under intense pressure to plan 
and implement WIA Summer Youth Programs, which in many locali-
ties either had not been operational or served small numbers of youth 
because of a lack of program funding. These programs had to ramp up 
and be fully operational (and capable of serving thousands of youth in 
some urban areas) within a few months (by no later than June 2009). 
For many states and localities, this meant recruiting large numbers of 
organizations (government agencies, nonprofi t organizations, and for-
profi t fi rms) willing to hire youth temporarily for the summer, as well 
as reaching out to youth and certifying their eligibility to participate 
in the programs. As is discussed later, when asked about their great-
est early accomplishments with Recovery Act funding, many state and 
local offi cials pointed to their rapid start-up of the WIA Summer Youth 
Program and their ability to place hundreds or thousands of youth in 
summer jobs so quickly. 
While states and local workforce agencies were pushing quickly to 
initiate or expand their WIA Summer Youth Programs, they were also 
digesting the rules and regulations for spending Recovery Act funds in 
other programs (e.g., the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs, 
the Wagner-Peyser Employment Service Program, Reemployment Ser-
vices [for UI claimants], Trade Adjustment Assistance, and the UI Pro-
gram). For example, workforce programs were exploring ways to do 
fi ve things: 1) increase the number of customers receiving training, 2) 
offer new and innovative training options in high-demand occupations, 
3) expand services available to unemployed and underemployed cus-
tomers, 4) respond to a surging volume of customers in One-Stop cen-
ters, and 5) improve data systems to track Recovery Act expenditures 
and produce better reports on program results. Table 2.1 provides sev-
eral accounts from states of their quick responses to the sudden avail-
ability of Recovery Act funding. However, as noted later, some states 
expressed concern that in a few instances guidance from the ETA was 
slower than they would have liked.
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One reason states were able to respond quickly is that they had 
heard that Recovery Act funding might become available in early 2009, 
and governors and state workforce agency staff proactively began plan-
ning how to react if funding did become available. Second, as soon 
as the legislation was enacted, state workforce agencies immediately 
identifi ed agencies and staff (generally, existing administrators) to be 
involved in planning the state’s response, and they formed steering 
committees to help with planning and overseeing Recovery Act imple-
mentation. As discussed later in this chapter, states also relied upon 
and sought out training and technical assistance provided by the ETA 
national and regional offi ces, as well as guidance provided by national 
workforce associations. 
State and local workforce agencies felt a great deal of pressure 
to plan carefully their responses to the Recovery Act. The pressure 
built for three reasons. The fi rst stemmed from the magnitude of the 
Recovery Act funding received. For example, WIA Adult and Dislo-
cated Worker funding under the Recovery Act often nearly matched the 
formula funds that agencies received for an entire year. Adding to the 
pressure was a second reason—the agencies’ awareness of the scrutiny 
that this funding was likely to receive. And third, the speed with which 
Recovery Act funding was to be spent meant that the agencies felt pres-
sure to hit the ground running, despite the need for careful planning.
ORGANIZATIONAL AND STAFFING RESPONSE
All of the visited states indicated that they worked within their 
existing organizational structure to plan and implement Recovery Act 
activities. As noted above, states did not have the time to develop new 
or elaborate organizational structures in response to Recovery Act fund-
ing. And because Recovery Act funding was temporary, states were 
reluctant to change their organizational structures, add new units or 
permanent staff, or build new infrastructure (except for modernizing 
information systems), all of which would have required funding when 
Recovery Act support was no longer available. In addition, states already 
had the substantive experience within existing organizational units and 
programs to plan and implement Recovery Act–funded employment 
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State Overview of state start-up and planning response
Arizona Arizona began planning for Recovery Act funds before the signing of the law. Arizona Department of Economic Security 
(DES) offi cials maintain good relationships with USDOL offi cials at the national and regional levels. In addition, the then-
head of Arizona’s Employment Administration served on a number of advisory committees and was active in NASWA. 
These connections helped the state to stay on top of Recovery Act legislation and to begin planning in advance. Offi cials 
noted that since the funding fl owed through the governor’s offi ce rather than directly to DES, there was some delay in 
receiving the funds while the governor completed strategic planning processes and prepared a Web site to track the funds. 
Arizona offi cials participated in a number of informational and technical assistance forums, including webinars and 
conference calls. There were statewide meetings with local boards to discuss plan modifi cations and other requirements.
Colorado The start-up time was very short for the state with regard to learning about and beginning to spend Recovery Act funds. 
The agency learned about funding under the Recovery Act in TEGL 1-08 (issued by USDOL in late February 2009). 
Recovery Act WIA and W-P funds were allocated and made available to the workforce regions within the state on March 
6, 2009, and, with the exception of RES funds, were targeted for total expenditure by June 30, 2010. Recovery Act–funded 
Summer Youth Employment Programs were launched between May 1 and July 1, with 70 percent of WIA Youth funds 
targeted for use by September 30, 2009. Local workforce areas were encouraged to spend their youth funds during the fi rst 
summer in which Recovery Act funds were available. 
Florida As soon as discussion began about the federal stimulus effort, Florida offi cials knew that the key was to move quickly 
and to get the local WIBs involved. The day following receipt of the funds from USDOL in March 2009, the funds 
were distributed to the local WIBs. State staff also attended many meetings in Washington, with NASWA and with the 
USDOL, and communicated everything they learned to the local WIBs. The state agency held regional meetings with the 
local WIBs, quickly set up a Web site and posted Q&As on the site, and set up a separate Web site for the “Florida Back 
to Work” program. They established several teams (e.g., for RES, Summer Youth, Workforce Florida, and agency and 
regional workforce boards) to make sure the information got out and to convey the urgency to spend funds wisely. Through 
conference calls and lots of communication, the local WIBs knew everything the state knew. Out of this process, the 
state developed extensive plans, program guidance, and training. State offi cials had an experienced workforce investment 
system that was prepared to deliver services, and they had no need for additional training. They pushed the local WIBs to
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spend as much money in the fi rst year as possible and required all local WIBs to submit their plans for implementing the 
Recovery Act by late August. They also required all local WIBs to submit a plan modifi cation for the Recovery Act, just as 
the USDOL required of the state. The state distributed funds in March 2009.
Louisiana State offi cials heard about the Recovery Act as soon as the president signed the bill. Within a few days, state offi cials 
were informed of their funding amounts by USDOL regional offi ce (RO) offi cials. These regional offi cials inquired about 
Louisiana’s plan, and the state offi cials started planning immediately, before the funds were in fact awarded. Similarly, the 
state offi cials initiated conversations with the local WIBs in order to get their planning started. The state in turn provided 
some training to the LWIBs; this consisted of one major meeting and weekly conference calls, principally focused on the 
WIA Summer Youth Program. For example, state staff helped one LWIB develop its recruitment approach.
Wisconsin The start-up time was very short for the state with regard to learning about and beginning to spend Recovery 
Act funds. The timeline was as follows:
2/09—The Recovery Act passes. 
3/09—The USDOL informs states about funding, rules, and regulations for the Recovery Act. 
4/09—Wisconsin plans for and begins to expend Recovery Act funds. 
6/09—The state makes substantial expenditures of Recovery Act funds on the WIA Summer Youth Program.
Prior to the Recovery Act enactment, the governor pulled together his cabinet to initiate planning for activities 
and rapid start-up (and expenditure) of stimulus funds; a statewide committee was also formed, the Offi ce of 
Recovery and Reinvestment (ORR), which met beginning in December 2008 to plan Recovery Act activities 
and spending so the state could hit the ground running. Two state staff persons were assigned to work full-time 
to help plan and coordinate Recovery Act activities. The Department of Workforce Development established a 
cross-divisional steering committee with various internal work groups, which planned activities and aimed at 
both maximizing funding and getting funds out the door as quickly as possible. 
SOURCE: Table is based on site visits conducted in states between December 2009 and June 2010. 
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and training activities. A further impetus to maintaining organizational 
structure was that the Recovery Act did not create any new programs, 
so funding fl owed directly to existing programs.
Despite making no discernible changes to the organizational struc-
tures of their workforce systems, all states—and to varying degrees 
local workforce agencies—used Recovery Act funding to add new 
staff to respond to the legislation’s mandate to provide additional or 
enhanced services (e.g., expansion or creation of Reemployment Ser-
vices) or to meet the rapidly rising tide of newly unemployed and 
underemployed workers fl ooding One-Stop Career Centers. Because 
Recovery Act funding was temporary in nature, the main staffi ng strat-
egy implemented by states and local agencies was to bring on tempo-
rary staff to fi ll new positions. Hiring occurred at both the state and 
local levels. For example, states distributed much of the WIA Recov-
ery Act funds by formula to local workforce investment areas, where 
hiring did occur—much of it by LWIBs or contractors (e.g., to staff 
resource rooms in One-Stops or to provide intensive/training services). 
The number of staff hired at the local level—particularly those hired by 
contractors—could generally not be estimated by state workforce agen-
cies. Some hiring of new, usually temporary, staff also occurred at the 
state level. Often this staff was hired to augment state staff involved in 
administering Wagner-Peyser/ES activities, Reemployment Services, 
and Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). Much of these temporary, 
Recovery Act–funded state Wagner-Peyser/TAA staff operated out of 
One-Stop Career Centers, providing direct customer services—staffi ng 
resource rooms, conducting a wide variety of workshops (e.g., orien-
tations, job readiness workshops, RES sessions, job clubs, etc.), and 
providing staff-assisted (case-managed) services. 
Several state and local workforce agencies indicated they experi-
enced some diffi culties or delays in bringing on new staff (even tem-
porary staff hired with federal funding) because of state or local hiring 
freezes, which sometimes occurred despite ETA requests to exempt 
from hiring freezes the positions funded with federal Recovery Act 
dollars. 
Also, in some states, as hiring was occurring using Recovery Act 
funding, regular staff may have been experiencing furloughs or lay-
offs. State and local workforce offi cials were in agreement that given 
the very sizable increase in the volume of One-Stop customers, the 
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availability and use of Recovery Act funding to hire additional staff to 
meet escalating demand for services at all levels (i.e., unassisted, staff-
assisted, intensive, and training services) was critical. In some local 
areas, workforce agencies indicated they needed even more staff than 
Recovery Act funding would permit to meet the surging number of cus-
tomers. Additionally, some state and local workforce agencies indicated 
that mandates to spend WIA Recovery Act funding primarily on train-
ing limited their fl exibility to add staff to work in the resource room and 
provide assessment and other intensive services required before indi-
viduals could enter training. Table 2.2 provides estimates (at the time 
when site visits occurred) of staff added by the states with Recovery 
Act funding. Table 2.3 provides detail to illustrate the approaches that 
states and local agencies took toward staffi ng with added Recovery Act 
resources. 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING IN RESPONSE 
TO THE RECOVERY ACT
With states and local workforce agencies under tight time constraints 
and intense pressure to plan responses and begin spending Recovery 
Act funds, they sought help in understanding Recovery Act require-
ments and in planning Recovery Act–funded activities from a variety 
of sources. In particular, states looked to the ETA—both its national 
and its regional offi ces—for guidance and technical assistance. In plan-
ning for Recovery Act implementation, states carefully reviewed the 
ETA’s Training and Employment Guidance Letters (TEGLs) and Train-
ing and Employment Information Notices (TEINs, now called Train-
ing and Employment Notices, or TENs) as they were released. States 
also participated in a series of ETA-sponsored webinars that provided 
technical assistance on the Recovery Act guidelines (e.g., they were 
tied to the issuance of a TEGL). Of particular interest early on were 
the guidance and technical assistance provided on implementation of 
the Recovery Act–funded Summer Youth Employment Program. Some 
states reported that it was diffi cult to get clear guidance on countable 
activities as well as guidance on how to assign customers and activities 
to Recovery Act or formula funding. 
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State
Estimates of state full-time-equivalent staff added because of the Recovery Act 
(including WIA-Adult, WIA-DW, WIA-Youth, and W-P)
Arizona ES/RES temporary and seasonal staff positions peaked at 160 under ARRA; 60 permanent positions 
have been retained.
Colorado 1 FTE (full-time green jobs coordinator).
Florida 9 FTE (full time/temporary).
Illinois 53 FTE—RES/ES (full-time/intermittent/temporary).
Louisiana 11 FTE (for Youth, RES, WIA) + 60 FTE (RES for Career Centers), all temporary. (Note: state hiring 
freeze includes federally funded positions.)
Maine 1.5 for coordination, leadership; 18 FTE (RES).
Michigan 2 FTE (full-time green jobs specialist and Summer Youth coordinator).
Montana 23 FTE—W-P/ES.
Nebraska 10 WIA; 32 ES/RES—permanent FTE.
Nevada RES 16.5 and 10 unknown; WIA staffi ng 21.5—no breakdown by program available.
New York 194 FTE (new staff for RES and rapid response activities).
North Carolina Employment Security Commission (ESC) hired about 450 temporary FTEs for UI and ES activities; 
there were 2–3 permanent hires for its labor market information (LMI) offi ce.
North Dakota Added temporary staff: 5 RES, 8.7 ES, and 4.6 WIA staff.
Ohio W-P—300–400 temporary.
Pennsylvania 153 FTE (permanent hires in state’s planning, monitoring, fi scal, rapid-response, grants, and 
performance-management units).
50 FTE (permanent hires for RES using UI Recovery Act funds).
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Rhode Island 30–35 temporary staff (10 W-P, 2 WIA, ~6 RES, + TANF).
Texas Added 325 ES staff.
Virginia 18 FTE (state-level ES/UI temporary, some rehires may be made permanent); 75–80 FTE (local ES/UI).
Washington 36 FTEs were hired, primarily for reemployment services and business services activities.
Wisconsin 50 FTE (W-P/RES; temporary) and 21 FTE (TAA).
NOTE: In Colorado and Michigan, the hiring of ES staff was at the local level. The fi gures in the table are estimates provided during 
interviews and may not be precise.
SOURCE: Table is based on site visits conducted in states between December 2009 and August 2010. 
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State State approaches to staffi ng using Recovery Act funding
Arizona Before the Recovery Act, Arizona had adequate workforce development funds. State-level budget issues, however, 
restricted hiring, and the Department of Economic Security (DES) was not able to fi ll many permanent positions, 
particularly in the ES. The department was able to get UI positions exempted in order to handle the increased claims, 
but it had to request critical needs waivers from the state’s Department of Administration to spend Recovery Act funds 
on other staffi ng. The waiver process added about one month to the hiring process. The DES was able to fi ll 20 seasonal 
ES positions that had been vacant. The department also added 25 temporary RES staff members for the reemployment 
centers; these workers were funded by formula ES funds when the Recovery Act expired. In addition, the department 
added seven trade counselors to the staff of fi ve in order to handle the expected 35 percent increase in TAA activities. In 
all, the DES increased its staff by approximately 25 percent. The WIA program still had vacancies to fi ll but has not yet 
received a hiring freeze waiver.
Colorado The state workforce agency did not add staff for Recovery Act planning and implementation; rather, the state used 
existing state staff members (who were required to work overtime in some cases). The one exception was that the state 
hired a green jobs coordinator with Recovery Act funds to oversee the many green jobs initiatives in the state. Staff 
members were overloaded at the state offi ce for a while through planning and early implementation of the Recovery Act. 
Existing staff members charged part of their time to Recovery Act administrative funding, allowing more non–Recovery 
Act funding to be released to workforce centers. The state had several other new grants to absorb some additional staff 
costs. Most staff members with additional work demands were exempt from required overtime pay. Limited overtime 
was granted to nonexempt staff. The state (and some local areas) were involved in implementing the Recovery Act, but 
at the same time the state was cautious about making new hires and was furloughing workers. Recovery Act funding 
was dispensed to local workforce areas in the form of staffi ng grants. Local areas were encouraged to hire additional 
temporary staff to meet increased demand for services in the One-Stop centers.
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Illinois At the state level, the Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity added one new staff member to coordinate 
state-level planning for and disbursement of WIA discretionary funds. LWIBs made staffi ng decisions, though they 
were encouraged not to increase permanent hires given the one-time nature of the funds. In the Illinois Department of 
Employment Security, 52 additional staff members were hired to help administer and carry out Reemployment Services. 
These staff members were hired in an “intermittent” category—a job classifi cation that limits hours to 1,500 under an 
initial contract, with the possibility to move into a permanent position. Intermittent employees also can be rehired in a 
subsequent year for another 1,500 hours. RES hires were cross-trained to be able to provide ES services. No new ES, UI, 
or TAA staff members were hired.
Louisiana The state was able to use some of the Recovery Act funds to hire additional staff members back who had been let go 
because of FY 2008 WIA budget rescissions. The state used Recovery Act funds to hire 11 staff members (for Youth 
Services, RES, and WIA programs). In addition, the state hired 60 new temporary staff members with Recovery Act funds 
to handle RES in the career centers. The governor instituted a freeze in hiring. Because of the previous year’s reductions 
in WIA and W-P funds, Recovery Act funding permitted offi cials to postpone further reductions in staff or program 
funding.
Ohio Most WIA Recovery Act funds were distributed by formula to local workforce areas. Local areas were encouraged to use 
funding to support training rather than building infrastructure or hiring new staff. Many local areas faced hiring freezes 
that limited their ability to hire new staff. The Recovery Act’s Wagner-Peyser funding was used to hire 100 intermittent 
(temporary) ES/Wagner-Peyser staff members, who were deployed throughout the state at One-Stops to handle the 
increased volume of customers and to conduct Reemployment Services orientations. Some additional temporary staff 
members were hired by local areas to administer and staff the Summer Youth Program.
Wisconsin Approximately 50 new full-time workers were hired for the state’s Wagner-Peyser program to provide RES. A total of 
21 new state ES workers were hired to provide TAA case management services. The state’s approach to meeting staffi ng 
needs with Recovery Act funding was to hire temporary full-time staff and authorize overtime (especially for UI). The 
main challenge with regard to staffi ng was to get new staff members trained to perform on the job. After exhausting 
Recovery Act funding, the state expected few layoffs within the Department of Workforce Development. Finally, the state 
imposed furloughs for all state staff—eight days a year, which amounted to about a 3 percent annual work and pay cut.
SOURCE: Table is based on site visits conducted in states between December 2009 and August 2010.
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Several state agency offi cials noted that ETA guidance related to 
reporting came out late in some instances, but they understood that the 
USDOL had very little time to produce this guidance given the short 
time frame between when the Recovery Act was enacted and when 
states and localities were to begin spending Recovery Act funding. 
State agencies also indicated that the guidance provided in TEGLs, 
TENs, “Questions and Answers” postings, and webinars was help-
ful. In addition, the ETA regional offi ce staff was available (both in 
person and by telephone) to answer questions and provide additional 
guidance, and state workforce agencies, to varying degrees, relied upon 
these offi ces for help. State workforce agencies indicated that they had 
received useful guidance from national workforce associations (includ-
ing the National Governors Association and NASWA) and, in some 
instances, from talking with other state workforce agencies. Overall, 
most states—particularly in light of the tight time constraints that the 
ETA (as well as the states) faced—believed that the provided training 
and technical assistance were useful for implementing the Recovery 
Act requirements. Nevertheless, some states mentioned technical assis-
tance as one of the overall challenges in implementing the Recovery 
Act. Some states indicated they would have appreciated more timely 
guidance on fi scal reporting requirements. 
Once state workforce agencies had received ETA guidance and 
attended training workshops, they provided guidance to local work-
force areas. State workforce agencies passed along ETA guidance (e.g., 
TEGLs and TENs) and made certain that local workforce agencies were 
aware of their existence and content. States also generally conducted 
webinars of their own for local workforce agencies, and they issued 
state policy guidance letters to local workforce areas on fi scal report-
ing, the WIA Summer Youth Employment Program, and other related 
Recovery Act issues of importance. States also conducted technical 
assistance sessions with the One-Stop directors and operations man-
agers, fi nancial managers, and management information system (MIS) 
coordinators, as well as the youth program coordinators. Finally, like 
the ETA, state workforce agency offi cials were available at any time for 
technical assistance.
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PLANS FOR SPENDING RECOVERY ACT FUNDS AND 
EARLY EXPENDITURES OF THOSE FUNDS
During site visits, states discussed their plans for spending Recov-
ery Act funds and provided assessments of expenditure patterns. As 
noted previously, the initial site visits were spread over a fairly long 
time span—December 2009 through July 2010—which was relatively 
early in the Recovery Act period. Almost one-half of the states inter-
viewed, nine of 20 states, experienced some delay in spending Recov-
ery Act funds. Delays resulted from a variety of factors, including hir-
ing freezes put in place at the state level (as in Arizona) or at the local 
level (as in Colorado), delays by the legislature in approving spending 
of Recovery Act funds (as in Illinois and Montana), civil-service hiring 
processes (as in Colorado, Illinois, and North Dakota), and changes in 
ETA implementation of waiver authority, which states had previously 
used to transfer funds from the WIA Dislocated Worker Program to the 
WIA Adult Program (as in Colorado and Florida).1 During the site vis-
its, state and local agencies were generally optimistic about their ability 
to spend the Recovery Act funds rapidly once they overcame the barri-
ers mentioned above. In tracking spending of the Recovery Act funds, 
the Department of Labor found that 18 of the 20 states in the research 
sample were projected to achieve federal outlays of 70 percent or more 
of their WIA Adult funds by September 30, 2010, and that 14 of the 
states were projected to have outlays of 70 percent or more of their 
Dislocated Worker funds by September 30, 2010. 
Note
 1. ETA staff indicated that waivers to transfer WIA funds from the Dislocated 
Worker Program to the Adult Program were subject to greater scrutiny because 
of congressional intent for the funds, the severe economic climate, and the large 
increase in dislocated workers.
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